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For Augustine, eternal goods are the virtues and goods of 
genuine friendship as they will exist in eternity—as the full 
expression of love for God and neighbor-love. This chapter 
considers such goods in their plurality and temporality. That 
is, it treats them as human beings are able to comprehend and 
pursue them—and sometimes even obtain and experience 
them—in this life. To do so, this chapter revisits Augustine’s 
letters to Ecdicia and Macedonius to take a closer look at 
where each succeeded and failed in their pursuit of higher, 
eternal goods. Augustine’s vision of obtaining eternal goods 
involves a process in which the practice of virtues in this life 
begins to mirror more directly the way virtues will exist in 
eternity. The chapter also highlights elements of Neoplatonism 
in Augustine’s theory of the virtues that shed new light on his 
understanding of the relationship between religion and 
society.
Keywords:   virtues, friendship, eternity, Neoplatonism, love of God, neighbor-
love, religion and society
We now reach the summit of our study of the hierarchy of 
goods found in Augustine’s letters and sermons. After chapter-
long consideration of the three representative temporal goods
—marriage and family, public office, and wealth—we now turn 
to their counterpart, the eternal goods. Three questions will 
guide our examination of them in this chapter: what are 
eternal goods? How do they relate to the classification of 
goods we saw in Chapter 1? And, finally, how does one obtain 
them? The majority of the chapter will be devoted to this third 
question.
5.1. Letter 220 to Boniface
Augustine’s correspondence with the military commander 
Boniface—whom we met in Chapter 3—provides a compressed 
definition of eternal goods that will serve as our starting point. 
Boniface was a Christian friend of Augustine, serving as 
military commander overseeing the protection of Roman Africa 
during the volatile early decades of the fifth century. His 
career was cut short when he fell into a conspiracy centered 
on rival generals Flavius Aetius, Flavius Constantius Felix, and 
the empress Galla Placidia.1 Boniface formed his own army 
and for two years fought against Roman troops sent from Italy 
to defeat him. In the middle of this rebellion (c.428 AD), 
Augustine wrote to him, imploring him to return to his role 
and fulfill his obligation to  (p.131) protect Africa from the 
Vandals (Letter 220). Augustine identifies the cause of 
Boniface’s rebellion as rooted, ultimately, in the condition of 
his soul: it is disordered love for the temporal goods of wealth 
and public office (and of the power associated with these 
goods) that has led Boniface to make bad use of them and to 
fail to fulfill his obligation to love and protect his neighbors. 
Augustine advises Boniface to reorient his desires and 
motivations for action toward higher goods. Rather than being 
motivated solely by desire for “the wellbeing [salus] of [his] 
mortal body … victory over human enemies, honor, temporal 
power, and the rest,” Boniface must attend to:
the wellbeing of the soul, together with the immortality 
of the body, the strength of justice, victory over the 
hostile passions, glory, honor, and peace for eternity … It 
is these that you must love, these you must desire, these 
you must seek by any means you can. Give to the poor 
for the sake of winning and keeping these [eternal] 
goods; pour out your prayers, practice fasting as you are 
able without impairing your physical health. Do not love 
the goods of this earth, however plentifully you may 
possess them. Make use of them in this way: do much 
good with them, but no evil for their sake. All such goods 
will perish, but good works will not perish, even those 
achieved with goods that are perishable.2
In the final sentences of the letter, we find Augustine’s familiar 
distinction between virtues of good use and renunciation. 
Boniface, as we learned in Chapter 3, was a man who 
understood this distinction and was eager to pursue the so-
called higher virtues of renunciation by abandoning “secular 
affairs” in order to pursue a contemplative life, far away from 
military service.3 Augustine advises him to remain in the 
military for the sake of the community’s safety, but to practice 
the virtues of celibacy and poverty while in public office. 
Boniface, Augustine says, should remain there and fight visible 
enemies while monks battle invisible ones through prayer—
teaming up to promote both the temporal and eternal 
wellbeing of the people.
Yet, in the excerpt from Letter 220 just cited, we find a 
different Boniface, a man who has relinquished his previous 
desires for a life of pecuniary simplicity and continence, and 
has instead plunged himself into an inordinate love affair with 
temporal goods without regard to the social or spiritual needs 
of himself or the community he is responsible to protect. The 
language of Augustine’s advice in Letter  (p.132) 220 
suggests that Boniface needs a firm reminder of the 
superiority of the interior goods (virtues) over exterior ones. 
Thus, in this exhortation we find a compressed answer to all 
three of our guiding questions: what are eternal goods? How 
do they fit into the classification of goods? And how does one 
obtain them?
Augustine tells Boniface that eternal goods are imperishable: 
goods not subject to the physical limits of bodily health or 
decay. With Augustine’s relationship to the ancient 
philosophical distinction between external goods and virtues 
already established in Chapter 1, it seems plausible to read the 
distinction here between temporal and eternal goods as one 
more expression of the distinction between external goods and 
virtues—and its corresponding picture of happiness. Yet Letter 
220 does not bear this all the way out. The list of eternal goods 
Augustine offers Boniface in this passage does include virtues, 
such as justice; yet it also includes eternal forms of temporal 
goods, such as the immortality of the body, and, perhaps more 
surprisingly, of some of the temporal goods relevant to 
Boniface’s role and obligations such as eternal honor, glory, 
and peace. So we find that, for Augustine, among the eternal 
goods are the virtues and also the replenished, imperishable 
forms of many of the temporal goods—namely, the intrinsic 
temporal goods of health and friendship. (Remember that 
health names the first form of friendship between body and 
soul, on Augustine’s account. Thus, immortality denotes a 
variety of spiritual health that is both embodied and eternal.) 
The notion that virtues have everlasting value is commonplace 
among ancient philosophers, especially the Stoics and 
Platonists with whom Augustine was most familiar.4 Yet the 
notion of an eternal version of external goods, and their 
relationship to one’s virtues, is rarer among ancient 
philosophers, and is extremely complicated conceptual terrain. 
Augustine’s own unique view is that eternal  (p.133) 
happiness consists of both virtue and an eternal form of the 
two preeminent external goods of health and friendship.5 We 
will return to this in a moment.
In this compressed presentation of eternal goods in Letter 220 
we also find that the virtues are both the way toward obtaining 
eternal goods and are themselves eternal goods. Augustine 
exhorts Boniface to “win and keep” eternal goods by 
cultivating particular virtues—almsgiving, fasting, making 
good use of temporal goods. These are the means to desire, 
seek, and possess eternal goods. This formulation parallels 
Augustine’s account of virtues and eternal goods in Book 19 of
The City of God (written at the same time):
[God] has given to men certain goods appropriate to this 
life. These are: temporal peace, in proportion to the 
short span of a mortal life, consisting in bodily health 
and soundness, and the society of one’s own kind; and all 
things necessary for the preservation and recovery of 
this peace. These latter include those things which are 
appropriate and accessible to our senses, such as light, 
speech, breathable air, drinkable water, and whatever 
the body requires to feed, clothe, shelter, heal, or adorn 
it. And these things are given [by God] under a most fair 
condition: that every mortal who makes good use of 
these goods suited to the peace of mortal men shall 
receive ampler and better goods, namely the peace of 
immortality and the glory and honor appropriate to it, in 
an eternal life made fit for the enjoyment of God and of 
one’s neighbor in God. He who uses temporal goods ill, 
however, shall lose them, and shall not receive eternal 
goods either.6
This passage reveals that, at the most rudimentary level, 
eternal goods are obtained when temporal goods are put to 
good use in the maintenance of temporal wellbeing both for 
oneself and one’s community. In this way, eternal goods are 
both the virtues of good use and some replenished version of 
temporal goods offered to human beings as a reward for virtue 
in the afterlife.
Still these shorthand formulations of the way to obtain eternal 
goods through the life of virtue in Letter 220 and City of God
19 require more explanation. What precisely does the good 
use of temporal goods entail, for Augustine? How does the 
distinction between virtues of renunciation and virtues of good 
use fit in? We do not find much in these texts regarding 
Augustine’s distinction  (p.134) between the virtues from 
good use of temporal goods in the formation of the narrower 
circles of oikeiōsis (e.g. marriage/family, public office, wealth) 
and the virtues from renunciation of these same goods in the 
formation of alternative forms of community (e.g. monastery, 
church). Perhaps this lack is rooted in what Augustine knows 
implicitly about his direct audiences and the virtues most 
relevant to their lives. Or perhaps we should not drive a major 
wedge between these two classes of virtues, for, on 
Augustine’s account, even the renunciation of a temporal good 
is its own sort of higher use of that good. Either way, 
Augustine ranks these virtue classes hierarchically, and one 
would expect to find some correspondence of their ranking in 
their relationship to eternal goods. And, as we have seen again 
and again, in Augustine’s eyes, good use of temporal goods 
requires something more than maintenance of physical 
security: good use also entails recourse to a spiritual 
conception of wellbeing. The primary feature of the good use 
of temporal goods is a return to the very source of these goods 
in God, both for oneself and for those in one’s community. 
Neither of these texts spells out the details of this crucial 
aspect of good use.
Usually discussion of Augustine’s view of eternal goods turns 
into discussion of eternal good—that distinctively Platonic 
ontological simplification of humankind’s highest good, 
happiness, found in absolute unification with the good itself.7
While this view of eternal good is undoubtedly present in 
Augustine’s writings—notably in Letter 155, which we will 
turn to later in this chapter—I want here to focus on eternal 
goods in their plurality and temporality. That is, taking my cue 
from Letter 220, I will consider eternal goods as human beings 
are able to comprehend and pursue them—and sometimes 
even obtain and experience them—in this life.8
 (p.135) To paint a fuller picture of Augustine’s conception of 
eternal goods we must examine his responses to the lives of 
people who pursue, and sometimes obtain, them. In the next 
two sections of this chapter, I will revisit two individuals 
(Ecdicia and Macedonius) from previous chapters and take a 
closer look at their successes and failures in pursuing and 
obtaining these goods. In the final section I will offer a 
general, moral-psychological picture of Augustine’s account of 
the way one obtains eternal goods through the good use of 
temporal goods and virtues. In brief, Augustine’s picture of 
obtaining eternal goods entails a process in which the practice 
of the virtues in this life begins to mirror more directly the 
way the virtues will exist in eternity. This process—which 
Augustine calls the perfection of the virtues—entails a return 
to God as the dual source of all virtues and temporal goods. 
Returning to God as the source perfects the virtues and 
creates a path to eternal goods.
5.2. A Failed Pursuit: Letter 262 to Ecdicia
The life of Ecdicia is a representative case of how truly 
difficult it is to comprehend, pursue, and obtain eternal goods 
on Augustine’s account.9 Her life is a perfect foil for Boniface’s 
superficial attachment to temporal goods. Augustine identifies 
Ecdicia’s error not as her desire for a soft, comfortable life, 
but rather in her idealization of the spiritual life. In Letter 262, 
Augustine recognizes and affirms her desire to pursue eternal 
goods through her practice of the so-called higher virtues of 
renunciation. What he warns against are the hidden forms of 
self-praise that lie at the core of her motivation and spoil her 
pursuit of eternal goods. Augustine criticizes her motives 
because of how their corollary actions affect those closest to 
her—those whose temporal and eternal wellbeing she is 
responsible for tending.
 (p.136) If the essence of obtaining eternal goods consists in 
clinging to God, as Augustine clearly thinks it does, then it 
makes sense to think of the virtues of renunciation as 
providing a more direct and unadorned route toward this 
goal.10 Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, there are no 
short-cuts to the highest good. And the straightforward path of 
renunciation does not always lead one toward God, and thus 
not toward eternal goods.
Augustine identifies three issues in Ecdicia’s pursuit of eternal 
goods.11 First, Ecdicia decides to practice the virtue of marital 
continence before her husband agrees to join her. In the letter, 
Augustine affirms that marital continence is “a good which 
surpasses marital chastity.”12 For chastity, the reader will 
remember, is the virtue associated with the good use of sex in 
marriage for the promotion of the two primary marital goals of 
faithfulness (fides) between the spouses and offspring 
(proles).13 Augustine also notes that Ecdicia’s husband has 
joined her in the practice of this higher-level marital virtue, 
and he congratulates them for their shared commitment. 
Nevertheless, Augustine chides Ecdicia for initially depriving 
her husband of the “marital debt of her body” well before he 
had joined her in the vow, citing Paul’s admonition in 1 
Corinthians 7 to: “[l]et the husband pay to his wife the debt he 
owes her; likewise let the wife pay to her husband the debt she 
owes him. A wife does not have authority over her body, but 
her husband does; likewise a husband does not have authority 
over his body, but his wife does” (1 Corinthians 7:3–4). Rightly 
ordered love for the good of marriage, Augustine insists, must 
involve both care for physical needs and a yielding of bodily 
authority in mutual love.
The second issue raised in Letter 262 relates to Ecdicia’s 
decision to pursue the virtue of poverty by donating all of her 
and her husband’s possessions to the poor without consulting 
her husband. This issue is more problematic than the first, in 
Augustine’s mind, because the explanation for her action is not 
that she moved toward a virtue more quickly than her 
husband, but that she made a rash and unilateral decision 
without her husband’s consent—which is at odds with the 
demands of a virtuous marriage. The good obtained through
 (p.137) her self-willed poverty has been, in this case, 
cancelled out by the damage caused to her friendship and 
union with her husband.14 “You need not repent over having 
given your property to the poor,” Augustine tells her, “but over 
not having wanted to have him [your husband] as a partner 
and guide in your good work.”15 For even if her husband was 
“moving rather sluggishly through distributing goods more 
generously,” Ecdicia’s role as wife and mother required that 
she should have tried first to coax her husband respectfully 
toward works of mercy.16 Then, “the two of you would have 
done in harmonious love much more wisely and much more 
fittingly and decently what you thoughtlessly did alone.”17
The third issue centers not on a specific virtue, but rather on 
an aspect of the lifestyle associated with these higher virtues 
of renunciation. Ecdicia, after making the vow of marital 
continence, has abandoned the traditional attire of a married 
woman in favor of wearing a widow’s dress (presumably the 
garb worn by those who had taken the vow of Christian 
widowhood, such as Juliana and Proba). It appears that it was 
this, more than the lack of sex or lost possessions, that upset 
Ecdicia’s husband—perhaps because it caused him public 
embarrassment. In Augustine’s letter, this third issue is 
identified as the central reason that her husband has taken up 
with another woman. Indeed, Ecdicia’s choice of attire 
represents, on Augustine’s analysis, her general confusion 
about how to obtain eternal goods. Her failure in the practice 
of the higher virtues, claims Augustine, results from a failure 
to love her husband. In the language of the letter, Ecdicia has 
failed to care for her husband’s “temporal [and] eternal 
wellbeing.”18
To understand Augustine’s claims about eternal goods in this 
letter, we must keep in view his understanding of how one 
should pursue eternal goods within the context of social and 
political responsibility. Leaders, he claims, should use 
temporal goods in order to tend the temporal and eternal 
wellbeing of those within the orbit of their care and friendship. 
This is the avenue for obtaining the greater, imperishable 
goods. Ironically, in Ecdicia’s fervent attempt to minister to 
the temporal wellbeing of the poor by giving away their 
possessions, she has neglected both the “temporal wellbeing” 
of her son and the “eternal wellbeing” of her husband. “Both 
of you [you  (p.138) and your husband,]” Augustine writes to 
Ecdicia, “should have regulated together what you should 
store up in heaven and what you should leave for the needs of 
this life for yourselves and your son, so that others are not fed 
while you are suffering.”19 Augustine closes the letter by 
exhorting Ecdicia to think more carefully about the essential 
connection between her fragile marriage and her son’s eternal 
wellbeing, “Your son needs oneness of heart between you and 
your husband.”20
Augustine’s exhortation to Ecdicia in Letter 262 is not 
intended as a browbeating. He is not saying: no, Ecdicia, you 
cannot really pursue the highest good, you are stuck in 
married life, stop trying so hard. Augustine is simply clarifying 
for Ecdicia that her roles as wife and mother—along with the 
correspondent duties and virtues of these roles—amount to a 
normative context for her pursuit of eternal goods. In cases of 
competing goods, the duties of love owed to her husband and 
son must trump the pursuit of ascetic virtue. Furthermore, 
when a virtue fractures household goods, it is no longer really 
a good at all for the one who practices it (even if it provides 
goods for others, as in the case of Ecdicia’s poverty). Ecdicia’s 
error was to so misconceive the higher virtues that she 
created a false conflict between them and the temporal goods 
of the household. Much like a photographic negative, this 
picture of how to obtain eternal goods reminds us of 
Augustine’s claims about the unity of the love commandments 
(to love God and neighbor) and the obligation of social and 
political leaders to obey these commands in the context of 
their roles and the virtues associated with the excellent 
performance of their role-specific obligations.
The litmus test of one’s love for the highest good, Augustine 
insists, is the quality of one’s relationship to the neighbors 
whom God has placed in one’s life.21 Preaching on one of his 
favorite texts, 1 John 4:20 (“If anyone says, ‘I love God,’ and 
hates his brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his 
brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not 
seen”), Augustine sounds a familiar note of the unity of the 
two love commands:
 (p.139) One wing is, “You shall love the Lord” … But 
don’t stick to one wing; because if you think you’ve got 
one wing, you haven’t even got that. “You shall love your 
neighbor” … I mean, if you don’t love the brother you 
can see, how can you love the God you can’t see? Add 
the other wing; in this way you will fly, in this way you 
will remove your cravings from earthly things, and fix 
your love [caritas] on heavenly goods.22
Ecdicia’s failure, we can then conclude, is found on the 
horizontal axis of the return to the highest good: a failure to 
love rightly the neighbors that God has placed within her 
circle of care and friendship. This account of Ecdicia’s failure 
echoes Augustine’s conception of God as highest common 
good (bonum commune), observed in Chapter 3, and the 
connection between the upward and outward axes of ascent to 
God that we focused on in Chapter 4.
Augustine’s advice to Ecdicia highlights the responsibility of 
Christian leaders to use temporal goods (even in the 
renunciation of those goods) to promote both the temporal and 
eternal wellbeing of oneself and those under one’s care, on the 
model of the expanding circles of oikeiōsis. He reminds her 
that, “the relation of strangers is not the same as that of 
persons bound together in a society … the relation of parents 
to their children is not the same as that of children to their 
parents. Finally, still other is the relation of husband and 
wife.”23
It is clear from this letter who Augustine thinks wears the 
spiritual mantle in Ecdicia’s household: Ecdicia, the ascetic 
overachiever. Augustine tactfully employs the language of 
Roman decorum throughout the letter, urging Ecdicia to play 
her domestic role in showing respect for her husband’s 
authority and, even more importantly, to try to repair their 
fragile marital friendship.24 Lest Augustine’s appeals to her 
husband’s authority be construed as uncritical  (p.140) 
patriarchalism, Augustine also clearly acknowledges the 
spiritual authority Ecdicia exercises in the family, and he urges 
her to be accountable for this role.25 His appeal to Ecdicia’s 
spiritual authority should not be interpreted as a type of 
enforced quietism, for it is clear how interwoven the social and 
spiritual forms of wellbeing are for Augustine in the letter:
But was your action of refreshing the bodies of the poor 
by more generous alms as great a good as the harm you 
caused by tearing the mind of your husband away from 
so good a commitment [to marital continence and also to 
Christianity]? Or should anyone’s temporal wellbeing 
have been more precious to you than his eternal 
wellbeing? If, while thinking of more ample works of 
mercy, you postponed giving your possessions to the 
poor in order that your husband might not be 
scandalized and be lost to God, would God not credit you 
with giving more abundant alms? … For, if bread shared 
with a poor person has great weight in heaven [i.e. it is 
an eternal good], how much weight ought we to think 
mercy has there, by which a human being is snatched 
from the devil, who is like a roaring lion seeking 
someone to devour [?].26
Ecdicia’s lofty pursuit of eternal goods has put her husband’s 
eternal wellbeing in jeopardy. Ecdicia’s unilateral ascent 
toward the highest good has left her husband’s relationship 
with God fractured. Still, the blame in this passage has no air 
of disrespect for Ecdicia’s spiritual ambition. It is rather a 
warning shot—a call for Ecdicia to take responsibility for her 
own power of spiritual authority. Not knowing the full details 
of either side of the case, we are unable to identify Ecdicia’s 
husband’s role in the failed relationship. We can assume that 
he is responsible for his sin of adultery and has a share in the 
blame for their separation. Nevertheless the lessons and 
insights about virtue offered to Ecdicia stand on their own, in 
isolation from her husband’s failures and any absolution that 
his guilt might provide for her faults.
 (p.141) Ecdicia’s failure to obtain genuine eternal goods is 
rooted in multiple failures. And since her disorderedly virtuous
action reveals disordered motivation, Augustine exhorts her to 
change her disposition and action:
Put on humility of mind … and write to him [your 
husband] a letter of apology, asking pardon for having 
sinned against him because you did what you thought 
you should do concerning your property without his 
advice and consent. You need not repent over having 
given your property to the poor but over not having 
wanted to have him as a partner and guide (participem 
et moderatorem) in your good work.27
We see here Augustine playing with the language of 
submission and equality (“as a partner and guide”) in his 
exhortation. We also find Augustine’s trademark emphasis on 
the virtue of humility as the necessary groundwork for the 
practice of the other virtues. As we saw in Chapter 2, the 
virtue of humility (humilitas) ranks higher than all of the 
highest ascetic virtues (e.g. celibacy, continence) and is 
necessary for the perfection of the other virtues.28 (We will 
return to this later.) We also see an emphasis on confession of 
sin and forgiveness as preconditions for acquiring humility. In 
Ecdicia’s case confession takes on the concrete practice of 
writing a letter of apology to her husband.29 Putting on 
humility requires self-examination, confession of sin, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the externalization of her inward 
process through the writing of an apology letter to her 
husband whereby she would also seek forgiveness.30
Greater goods or higher virtues are no longer such if they do 
not upbuild the friends and communities for whom one is 
responsible. Ecdicia’s choice of wardrobe reveals the content 
of her motivations more clearly than any of her other actions—
not to mention a certain neglect for the spouse within her 
circle of oikeiōsis. She dons the appearance of ascetic virtue 
without achieving the interior disposition necessary to perform 
her role as mother and wife in a way that helps her obtain 
eternal goods.
 (p.142) As we noted in Chapter 2, the root of Ecdicia’s 
dilemma, in Augustine’s view, is that she cannot discern 
between the highest good and her own idea of the good. Or, to 
put the point more precisely, Ecdicia cannot discern between 
loving the good (a life of true virtue) and her own idea of what 
loving the good looks like. For Augustine, this conflation is a 
form of spiritual self-deception that everyone succumbs to on 
some level. So, in many ways, Ecdicia’s problem is the 
opposite of Boniface’s. Boniface needs to lift his mind from the 
pursuit of temporal goods as a mere means toward pleasure 
and power, and to cultivate desire for the imperishable goods 
of the virtues directed toward God. Only by detaching his 
desire from temporal goods can he return toward God and 
begin the process of purification and healing for his desires. 
Ecdicia, on the other hand, has progressed to the point where 
she is quite ready to abandon temporal goods with fervor. And 
yet she seems no closer to the goal of the highest good than 
does Boniface. Ecdicia is more in love with her own idea of 
virtuousness than she is with practicing genuine virtue—which 
is inherently performative, always culminating in 
demonstrative love of God and neighbor. Just as Boniface 
needs to be detached for a time, or perhaps permanently, from 
his unhealthy love of certain temporal goods, so too Ecdicia’s 
love for her own virtuousness must be detached, cleansed, 
purified, and healed.31
In Letter 262 we recognize for the first time that, for 
Augustine, the return to the highest good is always a twofold 
return—the perfection both of one’s love for temporal goods 
and one’s own virtues. Each requires a process of 
dispossession and reorientation of goods toward their final end 
in God so that they may be seen clearly, appreciated fully, and 
used properly in temporal life. Only through this process of 
double return can one learn to use temporal goods and virtues 
“as if [he] were not using them,” as Augustine tells Boniface in 
Letter 220.32 This attitude of nonpossessive desire for one’s 
own goods is the telltale sign of a mature love for them. It 
reckons every good as a  (p.143) gift and follows each one 
toward its source in the highest good. Thus love for the 
highest good entails a perfection of one’s love for both 
temporal goods and virtues. Ecdicia gets the first part right—
as evidenced by her prowess in renunciation—yet she misses 
the second return completely.
The pursuit of eternal goods, on Augustine’s account, is 
difficult to theorize because it always refracts through the 
particular goods that make one’s roles, obligations, and 
relationships possible. For Ecdicia, this pursuit centers on her 
marriage, motherhood, household, wealth, and the many 
virtues associated with the use or abandonment of these 
goods. This sheds new light on Augustine’s conception of 
properly ordered love. For, as we have seen, the alignment of 
intensity of desire and degree of goodness are highly 
contextual and dependent on one’s setting, vocation, and 
circumstances. Ascent toward the good and descent into social 
and political life are not discrete movements of the soul, in 
Augustine’s eyes, for the soul is always partially clinging to the 
highest good in the midst of one’s life and practice of the 
virtues. As mentioned at the outset of this section, although it 
seems that the virtues of renunciation (e.g. marital continence, 
poverty) might be a more direct route toward the good, given 
the intrinsically social nature of happiness, on Augustine’s 
view, and its organization in the circles of oikeiōsis, it is all too 
possible to aim for an eternal good in ascetic abandonment of 
a temporal good, and to end up missing the good entirely. It is 
now time to consider a successful case: a political official who 
obtains eternal goods through the practice of the virtues 
associated with his office.
5.3. The Perfection of the Political Virtues: Letter 155 to 
Macedonius
Macedonius, the reader will recall from Chapter 3, was 
imperial vicar of Africa during the years AD 413–414, in which 
he oversaw the administration of justice in all of Roman 
Africa.33 During his  (p.144) tenure at this post Augustine 
appealed to him for clemency on behalf of a criminal 
condemned to capital punishment. Through their exchange of 
letters we learn that Macedonius grants the appeal, and 
Augustine writes to thank him and to congratulate him on his 
decision in Letter 155. The letter turns into an extended 
discussion of the relationship between virtue and happiness—
specifically as it is practiced and experienced in the life of a 
political ruler. In that letter we also learn that Macedonius has 
read the first three books of The City of God, which Augustine 
sent to him, and that he is both eager and capable of receiving 
the text’s philosophical meditation on happiness.
Letter 155 is Augustine’s most detailed account of the way 
eternal goods are obtained through the practice of the 
virtues.34 Augustine recognizes that Macedonius is hungry for 
such higher-level philosophical advice and suggests that he is 
right on the threshold of obtaining the imperishable goods 
constitutive of eternal happiness. Augustine declares that 
Macedonius’ life exhibits true longing for the heavenly 
commonwealth—the highest level of oikeiōsis—and the true 
friendship with God and neighbor that flow from there:
I can tell that your spirit is panting for God’s heavenly 
commonwealth, inspired by a love of eternity and of 
truth and of love itself … I see you approaching near to 
it, and I embrace you as you burn to possess it. True 
friendship also flows from there; and this ought not to be 
weighed by temporal goods, but drunk with freely given 
love.35
Elsewhere in the letter, Augustine also praises Macedonius for 
practicing the political virtues (prudence, temperance, 
courage, and justice) in his work as a public official—tending 
to the wellbeing of the political community.36 Nevertheless, he 
tells Macedonius that these political virtues—and the temporal 
wellbeing they are aimed at preserving—must be informed by 
the double commandment of love in order to be “perfected” 
and made “real.”37 Or in other words, they require the double 
commandment of love to be efficacious for obtaining eternal 
goods.
Augustine urges Macedonius to continue pursuing God as the 
source of all goods: both as the source of all temporal goods 
and as  (p.145) the source of his own virtues.38 It appears 
Macedonius has been at least partially successful in making 
the double return to God. And it is only by continuing this 
double return, Augustine claims, that the political official’s 
conception of wellbeing will be expanded from the merely 
temporal to the eternal horizon, even as he begins to envision 
what it might look like for him to use his office and its 
associated obligations to tend the temporal and eternal 
wellbeing of those under his care. Throughout Letter 155, 
Augustine challenges Macedonius to be attentive to and 
responsible for the end to which the people put the political 
wellbeing he struggles to provide them.39 And while the goal 
of tending the people’s temporal wellbeing is good, it does not 
go far enough—it is too indeterminate. Practicing the political 
virtues entails more than the physical health or security of the 
political community, on Augustine’s view. Properly ordered 
political virtues necessarily orient one toward higher goods. 
Yet what are these higher goods? Is there a highest good? 
Augustine thinks the political official cannot avoid these 
questions if he is to practice the virtues necessary for doing 
his job well.
A key reason that the temporal wellbeing promoted through 
the political virtues is inherently indeterminate and unstable, 
Augustine tells Macedonius, is that human beings often 
mistake the source of happiness for something that consists 
entirely in either temporal goods or virtues:
You can see, then, where you should look for the object 
of everyone’s desire, whether they are learned or not. 
Many fail, through error or pride, to learn where to look 
for it, and where to receive it. Both types are criticized 
together in one of the divine psalms: “those who trust in 
their own virtue and who boast in the abundance of their 
riches” (Psalm 49(48):6). This refers both to the 
philosophers of the present age and also to those who 
shun even such philosophy as that, saying that a people 
is happy if they have sufficient earthly wealth. Therefore 
we should seek virtue from the Lord our God who made 
us, so that we can overcome the evils of this life; we 
should also seek the life of happiness, so that we may 
enjoy it after this life for eternity. Thus both in virtue and 
in the reward of virtue “whoever boasts,” to quote the 
apostle, “should boast in the Lord (2 Corinthians 10:17). 
That is what we want for ourselves and for the city of 
which we are citizens. The source of happiness is not one 
thing for a human being and another for a city: a  (p.
146) city is indeed nothing other than a like-minded 
mass of human beings.40
This passage highlights why Augustine thinks a view of God as 
the highest good is necessary for a genuine conception of both 
individual and civic happiness. As it adapts Cicero’s 
presentation of the Epicurean and Stoic views of happiness in
Tusculan Disputations, the passage also briefly illustrates 
Augustine’s view of the limitations of a conception of 
happiness wholly exhausted by either temporal goods or 
virtue, or some combination of the two. The imperfection of 
virtue, fragility of temporal goods, and magnitude of human 
misery—considered cumulatively—challenge and destabilize 
all conceptions of happiness that do not make reference to 
eternal goods. The Stoic view that happiness consists solely in 
virtue exhibits insensitivity to the limits that suffering places 
on flourishing, as well as a prideful unwillingness to seek 
happiness from a source outside of one’s own control. For 
Augustine, only some conception of eternal happiness, 
received directly from its source in the highest good, can do 
justice to the combined force of our natural longing for 
happiness, our intuition that it consists in both virtue and
temporal goods, and the magnitude of misery that human 
beings can experience in this life.41
If civic happiness merely consists in the accumulation of 
temporal goods, then Augustine’s claims about its inherent 
indeterminacy and instability seem straightforward and 
require little substantiation. This sort of political wellbeing 
would be entirely subject to fortune. Yet Augustine recognizes 
that the philosophically astute, and perhaps Stoic, political 
readers among the intended audience of Letter 155 will not be 
satisfied with such a quick argument for the necessity of a 
guiding conception of God as the highest good and source of 
true happiness. Such readers would assuredly respond that 
civic happiness is not merely equivalent to the accumulation of 
temporal goods (or, “temporary advantages,” for the Stoics, as 
we saw in Chapter 1), but rather is these goods organized by 
virtuous political officials for the cultivation of a virtuous 
political community. This is undoubtedly a step up from a 
materialist conception of civic happiness on Augustine’s view, 
yet it still fails to perceive the true source of happiness.
For Augustine, if the political virtues are not referred to their 
source in God they cannot be used in the right way to direct 
people toward  (p.147) true happiness. Without this upward 
reference, on Augustine’s account, civic happiness, and the 
political official’s virtues, remain imperfect and insubstantial. 
Reference (referre) here can be understood as a continuously 
renewed recognition that this life’s goods are contingent gifts, 
and signals of something more than themselves.42 This helps 
clarify what Augustine means when he tells social and political 
leaders such as Boniface, Ecdicia, and Macedonius to tend 
both the temporal and the eternal wellbeing of those under 
their care. There is an ambiguous middle ground between 
temporal and eternal happiness that virtuous Christian public 
officials, such as Macedonius, must inhabit.
Augustine offers Macedonius the following exhortation, and 
memorable snapshot, of what the twofold return to God will 
require:
If you recognize the source of the [political] virtues you 
have been given and give God thanks; if you use them 
even in your secular position of honor to contribute to his 
worship; if you inspire and lead those people under your 
power to praise him both by living an exemplary 
religious life and through the devotion you show to their 
interests, whether by support or deterrence; if the only 
reason that you want them, with your help, to live more 
securely is so that they might win God, in whose 
presence they will live happily; then, all of your virtues 
will be real ones. They will develop and be perfected in 
this way through the assistance of God, whose generous 
gift they were. Then, without any doubt, they will bring 
you to the truly happy life, which can only be eternal.43
(my own emphasis)
Notice that it is only by making the second return that Ecdicia 
missed—i.e recognizing the source of one’s virtues and 
exhibiting appropriate gratitude for them—that Macedonius is 
able to “perfect” and “make real” his political virtues. 
Recognition and gratitude enable  (p.148) Macedonius to 
“use” his virtues appropriately—that is, to help both himself 
and others to return to God. Also notice the new motivational 
end involved in recognizing God as the source of one’s virtue: 
the goal of contributing to God’s praise. In this way Augustine 
is reclaiming piety as the fifth political virtue, or, more 
precisely, as the virtue that perfects the other political virtues. 
In Letter 155 true piety is both true worship of God and also 
obedience to the double commandment of love.
It should also be noted that Augustine’s exhortation to true 
piety is not a call to proselytization on Macedonius’ part. 
Augustine tells Macedonius to help inspire and lead those 
people under his power “to worship God both by living an 
exemplary religious life and through the devotion you show to 
their interests.”44 Augustine is careful to express his respect 
for the distinctive obligations associated with Macedonius’ 
role as political ruler.45
Augustine continues his presentation of the perfection of the 
political virtues through true piety in a further description of 
the political virtues as they will exist in eternity—that is, as 
eternal goods:
One virtue alone will exist there [in eternal happiness]: 
both virtue and the reward of virtue. As the man who 
loves this says in the sacred discourse: “For me it is good 
to cling to God” (Psalm 73:28). Both complete and 
eternal wisdom, and also a life now fully happy will 
consist in this. Now we will have reached the eternal and 
supreme good; and it is the completion of our good to 
cling to this forever. We might also call this practical 
wisdom, because it will cling very prudently to the good 
that it will never lose; and courage, because it will cling 
very tenaciously to the good and will not be torn from it; 
and moderation, because it will cling in purity to the 
good, as it cannot now be corrupted; and justice, 
because it will cling very rightly to the good, which it 
deserves to serve.46
In this passage we find the ontological reduction of eternal 
goods to a single eternal good, a topic of frequent focus 
concerning Augustine’s view of eternal happiness.47 The 
eternal good, on Augustine’s account, is the union of God as 
highest good, eternal happiness, and the virtues as they will 
exist in eternity—as the singular virtue of clinging to the 
highest good through love. As has been pointed out  (p.149) 
by Robert Dodaro, this description of the political virtues as 
they will exist in eternity mirrors Plotinus’ account of the 
“purificatory virtues” found in Enneads I 2. There, in his 
treatise on virtue, Plotinus provides a parallel description of 
the four political virtues as they exist in the soul of the one 
who ascends to a vision of the good itself.48
Like Plotinus’ account, Augustine emphasizes the fecundity of 
the absolute good (its overflowing in creation) and the way 
this fecundity relates to the inherently social nature of a 
genuine encounter with the good. The soul that ascends 
toward the true good wants others to share in this good with 
it.49 On this view, there is genuine continuity between the 
political virtues as they exist and are practiced now in 
temporal life and as they exist in their perfected, eternal form. 
Macedonius’ work in tending the political community’s 
temporal wellbeing and practicing the political virtues has, 
therefore, in Augustine’s eyes, prepared him to obtain eternal 
goods.
Augustine also offers Macedonius a description of the political 
virtues as they exist in transition—on their way toward 
perfection—as plural manifestations in time of the single 
virtue that constitutes the eternal good:
Moreover, even in this life there is no virtue except that 
of loving what ought to be loved. Prudence consists in 
choosing that, courage in allowing no hardships, 
moderation in allowing no temptations, justice in 
allowing no pride, to divert one from it. What should we 
choose to love particularly, if not the one thing we can 
find that is unsurpassed? This is God; and if in loving 
anything else we make it preferable or equal to him, we 
have forgotten how to love ourselves. The nearer we 
approach to him, the better it is for us; for nothing is 
better than him.  (p.150) We approach him, however, 
not by moving but by loving. We will have him nearer to 
us the more we can keep pure the love that carries us to 
him: he is not spread out or enclosed in physical space. 
He is present everywhere, and entirely everywhere; we 
can reach him then not by foot, but by character. 
However, our character is usually judged not from what 
we know, but from what we love. It is good and bad loves 
that make good and bad characters … Let us do 
everything we can, then, to bring to him also those whom 
we love as ourselves; if, that is, we can realize that loving 
ourselves means loving him.50
This translation of the political virtues into the idiom of the 
one true virtue—a society of lovers clinging to the highest 
good in eternity—is perhaps Augustine’s most exalted 
presentation of the transformation of political virtues into 
eternal goods. He offers it to a man mired in public affairs and 
the daily legal administration of Roman Africa.
Augustine closes the letter to Macedonius with the highest 
compliment paid to an individual to be found in all of his 
writings: “Though you wore the belt of an earthly judge you 
appeared to have your mind fixed on the heavenly 
commonwealth.”51 This depiction of Macedonius’ mind 
elevating his duties, virtues, and even his official uniform, 
stands in profound contrast to Augustine’s admonishment of 
Ecdicia for her choice of dress: “Even if your husband forced 
you to wear the attire of a married woman and not that of a 
widow … you could have had a humble heart in your proud 
attire.”52
The perfection of the political virtues that Augustine describes 
to Macedonius in Letter 155 can be summarized in this way: 
the highest virtue is love of God, the highest good. Practice of 
this virtue requires two different returns: a return to God as 
the source of all temporal goods and as the source of one’s 
virtues. By making this double return, the political leader 
learns what true wellbeing consists in and is thus able to 
promote the wellbeing of those under his care. The double 
return also provides the political leader new motivational 
goals for virtuous activity beyond the pursuit of his own 
wellbeing (and that of the political community): love of God, as 
the highest good, for his own sake; and the practice of the 
political virtues for the sake of bringing praise and glory to 
God who is the source of all excellence (virtue). In this way, 
God is both praised as the source of one’s virtues and loved as 
the source of all temporal goods.
 (p.151) Conversely, Augustine warns Macedonius that his 
virtues and the temporal happiness they provide for the 
political community will turn out to be illusory if he does not 
allow the double return to God to perfect his virtues:
Take all your virtues: all the prudence with which you try 
to serve human affairs, all the courage with which you 
allow no enemy’s wickedness to frighten you, all the 
moderation through which you keep yourself from 
corruption when surrounded by the rottenness of 
contemptible human habits, all the justice which you use 
to judge correctly in assigning to each his own. Suppose 
that you employ all these virtues in toiling and struggling 
[merely] for the physical security of those you want to do 
well … If so, neither your virtues nor the happiness that 
comes from them will be real … I want to say this: if any 
of your governing, however informed by the virtues I 
listed, is directed only to the final aim of allowing human 
beings to suffer no unjust hardships in the flesh; and if 
you think that it is no concern of yours to what end they 
put the peace that you struggle to provide for them (that 
is, to speak directly, how they worship the true God, with 
whom the fruit of all peaceful life is found), then all that 
effort towards the life of true happiness will not benefit 
you at all. I appear to be rather shameless in saying 
this.53
The language of this appeal is strong. In what sense is 
Macedonius responsible for practicing true piety (true worship 
of the true God) and cultivating it among the people? If this 
were merely a matter of establishing Christianity as the 
imperial cult, it seems peculiar that Augustine makes his 
appeal in the complicated language of the perfection of the 
political virtues. Rather, Augustine is employing a complex 
theological and philosophical conception of virtue and 
detailing the role piety plays in orienting a public official’s 
practice of the political virtues toward their true end in God.
5.3.1. True Piety
Augustine’s correspondence with Macedonius presents his 
most detailed account of true piety as the perfecting virtue 
and as the fulfillment of the commands to love God and 
neighbor. Read together, the letters (Letters 152–155) present 
a picture of true piety  (p.152) as an integrated complex of 
the just praise that human beings owe to God as the source of 
all goods and virtues, properly formed self-love, and just 
treatment of the neighbor on the basis of his or her humanity 
(see Letter 153 on capital punishment). Augustine concludes 
his reflection on the perfection of the political virtues through 
true piety by saying:
We ought therefore “to love God and our neighbor as 
ourselves,” so that we will lead anyone we can to 
worship God by comforting them with kindness, or 
educating them through teaching, or restraining them 
through discipline, in the knowledge that “all of the law 
and the prophets hang on these two commandments” … 
Here we have the practice of the virtues, there [in 
eternal happiness] their result; here their labors, there 
their reward; here their duties, there their goal … Piety, 
therefore, that is the true worship of the true God, is 
beneficial in every way. It protects against hardships in 
this life, or else softens them; and it brings us to that life 
and that security where we will suffer no more evil and 
enjoy the supreme and eternal good. I urge you to 
pursue it more perfectly and hold on to it with great 
tenacity; I urge this on myself also.54
Here, at the end of Letter 155, Augustine pulls all the threads 
of piety together in the double commandment of love and 
offers an account of the way that love perfects and actualizes 
the political virtues associated with tending the wellbeing of 
the political community. True piety is fulfillment of the double 
commandment of love, and functions like a Plotinian 
purificatory virtue in reorienting the political ruler’s soul and 
perfecting his virtues—turning them into eternal goods.
What does true piety consist in? Given Augustine’s claims in 
Letter 155, it cannot involve the mere installation of 
Christianity as imperial cult. True worship of the true God is 
not liturgical practice in this case but, rather, the archetypal 
virtue of love that orients everything that the political ruler 
does in his office. The political official’s role holds him 
accountable to a special aspect of this project of contributing 
to God’s praise: referring the people under his care toward the 
highest good through the example of his life and the devotion
he shows to their interests.55 This devotion, Augustine writes, 
entails educating, disciplining, and protecting the people in 
such a way that they are  (p.153) drawn toward the highest 
good.56 Augustine is keen to show “respect” for Macedonius’ 
office and its particular demands—which are all aimed at the 
political community’s welfare.57 As we saw in Chapter 3, there 
is a distinct difference between the roles of judge and bishop, 
in Augustine’s mind, and the religious transformation of the 
political sphere happens, if it happens at all, at the level of a 
political ruler’s practice of the virtues associated with the 
excellent performance of his office.
True piety also provides the political official with a new 
motivation for virtuous action. Augustine offers Macedonius a 
shorthand formulation of the idea in Letter 155:
Therefore we should seek virtue from the Lord our God 
who made us, so that we can overcome the evils of this 
life; we should also seek the life of happiness [from him], 
so that we may enjoy it after this life for eternity. Thus 
both in virtue and in the reward of virtue “whoever 
boasts,” to quote the apostle, “should boast in the 
Lord” (2 Corinthians 10:17).58
Augustine’s presentation of God’s praise as the motivational 
goal necessary for an account of true virtue (the perfection of 
the political virtues) and of a complete definition of happiness 
has yet to be understood, or fully appreciated, by interpreters 
of his thought. Reorienting one’s motivation toward God’s 
praise is an essential step in the return to God as the source of 
one’s virtues. Indeed, it functions as the motivational 
counterpart of the grateful recognition of God as the source of 
one’s virtues. Many interpreters have puzzled over 
Augustine’s remarks about the necessity of true piety for true 
virtue. Is the connection between piety and virtue mere 
conceptual polemics, or genuine philosophical analysis of 
virtue?59 In the next  (p.154) section of this chapter, I propose 
a fresh answer to this question by considering the details of 
Augustine’s account of motivation for virtuous action. The 
practice of true piety, for Augustine, entails the completion of 
the practice of all the other virtues through a double return to 
God as both source of temporal goods and virtues.
5.4. The Twofold Return to God: Praise and Love
To understand Augustine’s advice on obtaining eternal goods 
in Letter 155 to Macedonius, we now need to take a closer 
look at both movements of the return. First, we will look at the 
return to God as source of virtue. This is the movement with 
which Ecdicia had the most trouble. Judging by the details of 
Augustine’s advice in Letter 155, Macedonius has made 
significant progress on this leg. Second, we will consider what 
it means to return to God as the source of all temporal goods.
The twofold return to God, in Augustine’s eyes, is a movement 
of praise and love. Praise is the consummation of one’s return 
to God as the source of one’s virtues. Love is the culmination 
of desire, found in continually renewed awareness that life’s 
goods are contingent gifts, and signals of something more than 
themselves.
For as one’s praise [of God, the highest good] improves 
and extends, so one’s love and affection increases in 
fervor. And when this is the case, humankind cannot but 
advance with sure and firm step to a life of perfection 
and happiness. This, I suppose, is all we wish to find 
when we  (p.155) speak of the highest good for 
humankind, to which all must be referred [referre] in life 
and conduct. For the good plainly exists; and we have 
shown by reasoning, as far as we were able, and by the 
divine authority which goes beyond our reasoning, that it 
is nothing else but God Himself. For how can any thing 
be the highest good for a human being but that in 
cleaving to which he or she is happy? Now this is nothing 
but God, to whom we can cleave only by affection, 
desire, and love.60
This passage highlights the symmetrical movement of praise 
and love in one’s return to God. Indeed, for Augustine, praise 
and love are the twin motivations necessary for the perfection 
of virtue.
5.4.1. God as the Source of Virtue
Based on Augustine’s advice in Letter 155, we can say, in 
shorthand, that eternal goods are obtained when one clings to 
God as the highest good in the midst of using temporal goods 
(and the virtues associated with their use or renunciation). Yet 
how, precisely, does one so cling to God?
As the quotation above makes plain, it takes place at the level 
of “affection, desire, and love.” In Chapter 2 we considered 
Augustine’s distinction between virtues that characterize both 
disposition (habitus) and action (opus), and those that 
characterize disposition only. And to understand the moral 
psychology behind Augustine’s account of obtaining eternal 
goods, we must have his distinction between virtuous action 
and motivation for virtuous action in view. After all, the goal 
for virtuous activity is love of God and neighbor—and as we 
saw in Letter 155, neighbor love and healthy self-love find 
ultimate harmony in love for God as the highest good. Eternal 
happiness, according to The City of God, consists in “perfectly 
harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and of one 
another in God.”61 Love of God is thus the highest virtue on 
Augustine’s account and also the singular eternal good. Our 
goal in this section is to unpack what it means for one to cling 
to God as the highest good in the midst of moving about and 
using so many goods in this life, including the virtues. In what 
ways can God be the ultimate end of each of one’s virtuous 
actions?
Loving God, the highest good, provides a twofold motivational 
goal. It simultaneously represents loving the highest good for 
oneself  (p.156) (i.e. eternal happiness) and also loving God, 
the good, for his own sake. The two goals come together at the 
highest level of motivation for virtuous action. Given that 
happiness is inherently social on Augustine’s view, as is the 
practice of all the virtues and use of all temporal goods, 
actions are always to be judged (admired or condemned) by 
the community in which they are performed. In this way, virtue 
is inherently tied to social practice and systems of praise and 
blame.
This connection is beneficial insofar as it promotes 
identification with the group’s morals and social 
accountability. Yet it can result in two related problems, given 
our keen ability to distinguish between an action and the 
motivation for that action. In a penetrating analysis of Psalm 
118(119):37—“Turn my eyes away that they may not see 
vanity; give me life in your way”—Augustine brings this 
distinction to the foreground:
When we do something good, what we have in view 
matters a great deal. Any service we render is to be 
evaluated not in itself but according to the end [finis] on 
which we have our eye; we must consider not only if 
what we do is good but also whether we are doing it for a 
good purpose. The psalmist is asking that the eyes with 
which we envisage the end of our virtuous actions may 
be averted from vanity [uanitas], or, in other words, that 
when he does something good, he may not fix his gaze on 
vanity as the motive of his action.62
Social admiration and praise for virtuous action is not a bad 
thing, on Augustine’s view, “for what can be more salutary for 
people than to admire what they ought to imitate?”63 But, on 
the other hand, what is “blameworthy is to make the attracting 
of admiration the motive for one’s action, for this is to set 
one’s sights on vanity.”64 And, what is more:
Among all vain human objectives, the vainest is winning 
the praise of others. Many people reputed great in this 
world have achieved their manifold great deeds with a 
view to winning praise. They have been highly extolled in 
pagan civilizations, these heroes who sought glory not 
with God but in human estimation. For the sake of fame 
and glory they have lived prudently, bravely, temperately, 
and justly; they won praise indeed, but in attaining it 
they received their reward: vain men won a vain prize.65
 (p.157) This passage resonates with Augustine’s arguments 
about the pride of Roman glory and the limits of pagan civic 
virtue in Book 5 of The City of God. Yet something significant 
appears in this passage that is not present in The City of God. 
The vanity of making human admiration one’s sole motive for 
virtuous action results in a social consequence harmful to the 
wellbeing of the political community.
First, in Augustine’s exposition of Psalm 118(119), we find that 
because glory is determined solely by the standards of praise 
and blame within the community, it is subject to communal 
recognition. This can be socially beneficial, as we noted, but it 
also means that it is continually threatened by other 
community members’ achievements, and memories of those 
achievements, and thus becomes a competitive good. Because 
of the lower-level motivation involved in the pursuit of human 
glory, and because we can distinguish between motivation and 
virtuous action, systems of competing glories engender a 
social attitude of suspicion toward the hidden motivations that 
might lie underneath another person’s virtuous action.
No one’s motives for virtuous action are entirely pure, in 
Augustine’s view. And in the competition for glory, most people 
instinctively project this moral-psychological gap—along with 
the correspondent shame—onto other members in the 
community. This is especially true when one is intent on 
acquiring virtue for social praise. Glory requires comparing 
oneself to, and measuring one’s own deeds by, the standard of 
others’ conduct. Thus, virtuous actions motivated solely by the 
reward of human glory quickly fall prey to a cycle of 
comparison, conformity, interior shame, and external 
suspicion.66
[A]s long as a person does not turn his eyes away to 
prevent them from seeing vanity [i.e. making one’s sole 
motive for virtuous action socially conferred glory], he 
will suspect that what goes on in himself goes on in 
others too. So, for instance, he thinks that his own 
motives for worshipping God are theirs also, or he thinks 
that another person does virtuous actions for the same 
reason as he does. This happens because although other 
people can see our actions, the end we envisage is 
hidden. Hence the possibility of suspicion arises, and 
someone may  (p.158) take it upon himself to judge the 
hidden motives of others. Such conclusions are generally 
mistaken; and even if they are correct, the self-appointed 
judge has no right to suspect something of which he is 
ignorant. The Lord warns us against a suspicious 
attitude … He tells us not to perform virtuous actions for 
the sake of winning human praise from others … lest we 
suspect people whom we see to live good lives, but 
whose purposes [fines] we do not see, of being motivated 
in their well-doing by some [bad] motive … God 
commands us “Do not judge, lest you be 
judged” (Matthew 7:1).67
Augustine’s claims in this exposition of Psalm 118(119) and 
the cycle of comparison, conformity, shame, and suspicion cast 
new light on his more well-known criticism of systems of civic 
virtue oriented toward a conception of socially conferred glory 
(as was especially the case in the Roman literature and 
popular culture most familiar to him). Political glory and its 
relationship to eternal goods appears as a prominent theme in 
Augustine’s letters to the public officials Boniface, Darius, 
Marcellinus, Volusianus, and Macedonius.
The passage above clarifies Augustine’s appeal to Macedonius 
to make God’s praise the motivation of his practice of the 
political virtues. This motivational reorientation is central to 
the work of obtaining eternal goods and in returning to God as 
the source of one’s virtues. Making one’s motive for virtuous 
action God’s praise is an essential part of being released from 
vanity (i.e. making social praise the overarching motive for 
action) and suspicion of others’ motives. Seeking God’s praise 
does not engender competition, as does humanly conferred 
glory. God is the good itself, so there is no comparative edge 
that one could possibly attain.
If it happens that a just person does attract human 
praise in some degree, such praise must not be made 
into the object of his or her actions. Praise must be 
redirected to the glory of God, for whose sake truly good 
people perform their good actions, because such people 
become good not by their own powers but by God’s gifts 
… The praise given by other people must not be the
purpose of our virtuous actions; let us rather correct 
such praise and refer everything to the praise of God, 
since whatever in us rightly deserves praise comes from 
him.68
 (p.159) The motivational goal of praising God remedies the 
damaging effects of glory on civic virtue in two ways, for 
Augustine.
First, by making one’s goal the love and praise of God, one 
distinguishes between civic virtue and mere social conformity 
and acknowledges God as the transcendent standard of 
goodness to whom one is accountable (revealed by the dictates 
of both conscience and Scripture). In the same exposition of 
Psalm 118(119) Augustine details how a desire to act in 
“conformity” with God as transcendent standard tempers the 
dangers of social conformity.69
Appealing to God as transcendent standard of goodness entails 
an assessment of one’s conduct in the light of one’s conception 
of God as the highest good. This appeal highlights an 
important aspect of the perfection of virtue, beyond seeing 
God as source of one’s virtues and making God’s praise one’s 
goal for the practice of virtue. The truly virtuous, Augustine 
claims, think at least as much of their virtues’ imperfections 
and outright vices as they do about their more stable virtues.70
The man of true virtue, who loves, believes and hopes in 
God, attends more to those things in himself which 
displease him than to those, if there are any, which are 
pleasing to him or, rather, to the Truth [God]. Nor does 
he attribute what is now pleasing in him to anything 
other than the mercy of Him Whom he fears to displease. 
To God he gives thanks for what is healed in him, and 
pours out his prayers for those things which are as yet 
unhealed.71
Holding oneself accountable to God as the standard of 
goodness thus entails practices of self-assessment, confession 
of one’s shortcomings, and resolve to change one’s 
motivations and actions. These practices are an integral 
component of the perfection of virtue, obtaining eternal goods, 
and the return to God as the source of virtue. Such practices 
continuously renew one with a sense of fallibility and 
dependence on the good. Recall the essential role of self-
examination and confession of sin in Augustine’s advice to 
Macedonius on whether to pardon the criminal. For a judge in 
Macedonius’ position, practicing prudence, justice, and 
mercifulness requires constant self-examination in light of God 
as transcendent standard of goodness.
 (p.160) This leads to the second way that making God’s glory 
one’s goal for virtuous action remedies (or begins to remedy) 
the cycle of glory that Augustine thinks is so corrosive of 
genuine civic virtue. In the final paragraph of his exposition of 
Psalm 118(119), Augustine presents a complete definition of 
true piety’s relation to love of God and neighbor that parallels 
what we found in Letter 155. He claims that the practices of 
self-examination, confession, and repentance are all necessary 
for cultivating genuine love of neighbor. Suspicion of base 
motives, on Augustine’s account, is merely a way of lifting 
one’s virtuous actions above another’s in the pursuit of a 
limited supply of socially conferred glory. This form of 
suspicion is a soul disease that can only be healed through the 
remedy of genuine love (caritas) for the neighbor: “To enjoy 
suspecting evil [motives] that one cannot see is a disease, but 
there is a remedy, and that is love [caritas], which is never 
jealous.”72
As we noted in Letter 155 to Macedonius, Augustine does not 
think it possible to love the neighbor appropriately without 
first loving God as one’s highest good. Augustine closes the 
above exposition of Psalm 118(119) with a parallel claim about 
the inherent unity between the love commands: “Look at me: I 
have longed to love you [God] with all my heart, all my soul, 
and all my mind, and my neighbor as myself.”73 We can now 
see more clearly why this is the case, for Augustine. Loving 
God as the highest good entails a recognition of God as the 
source of one’s virtues, a reorientation of one’s motivation for 
virtuous action toward the goal of God’s praise, and a critical 
assessment of one’s shortcomings in the light of God’s 
perfection. Thus, the two remedies for the pitfalls of social 
glory (confession of sin and genuine neighbor love) work in 
tandem.
By making God’s praise one’s motive for virtuous action, one is 
freed from the cycle of comparison, conformity, shame, and 
suspicion. To practice virtue for the sake of God’s glory is to 
bring praise to the very source in which one’s excellence 
participates. This is the appointed consummation of virtue, on 
Augustine’s view, because virtue represents the very measure 
of one’s participation in God. The culmination of virtue has 
salutary effects on the whole network of social practices and 
civic virtues that make up political life insofar as praise 
remedies the deficiencies of the cycle of glory as a competitive 
social good.
 (p.161) It is important to note that, for Augustine, 
recognizing God as the source of one’s virtues is a claim about 
the ontology of one’s participation in the good—and not a 
claim about a one-directional divine gift that wipes out human 
agency. In the perfection of the political virtues there is no 
competition between divine and human agency. Augustine’s 
conceptual language for this leg of the return is that of 
intimacy. The nearer one approximates to the source and 
ground of one’s virtues, the nearer one approximates to 
oneself. Fully realized agency is not autarkic, for Augustine.
Notice also that Augustine’s description of the perfection of 
the virtues to Macedonius is erotic, in the Platonic and 
Plotinian sense: a picture of one clinging to the good rather 
than being annihilated by it.74 It is a dispossession that leads 
to consummation. This vision of clinging, Augustine tells 
Macedonius, must inform the practice of the virtues in time. 
Thus, recognition of one’s virtues as divine gifts is central to 
the way piety perfects the other virtues. Furthermore, this is 
one of the reasons that true piety is necessary, on Augustine’s 
account, for the other virtues to be used rightly in promoting 
the community’s wellbeing. Only in this way can virtues be 
perfected, made real, and motivated by freely given love for 
God and neighbor without a privatization of love for one’s own 
goods and virtues.
Augustine’s account of perfected political virtues and true 
happiness in Book 5 of The City of God mirrors the final 
paragraphs of Letter 155 to Macedonius. Although the 
political official described in Book 5 of The City of God is 
ostensibly an emperor, the analysis given there applies more 
broadly to all godly public officials. Given that Augustine was 
writing Book 5 and Letter 155 at the same time, and given the 
details of the virtues and practices recommended here (e.g. 
gentleness, pardon, punishment), one cannot help but wonder 
if this passage refers to the concrete figure of Macedonius:75
[Political officials] are happy if they rule justly; if they 
are not lifted up by the talk of those who accord them 
sublime honors or pay their  (p.162) respects with an 
excessive humility, but remember that they are only men; 
if they make their power the handmaid of His majesty by 
using it to spread His worship to the greatest possible 
extent; if they fear, love and worship God; if they love 
that Kingdom which they are not afraid to share with 
others more than their own; if they are slow to punish 
and swift to pardon; if they resort to punishment only 
when it is necessary to the government and defense of 
the commonwealth, and never to gratify their own 
enmity; if they grant pardon, not so that unjust men may 
enjoy impunity, but in the hope of bringing about their 
correction; if they compensate for whatever severe 
measures they may be forced to decree with the 
gentleness of mercy and the generosity of benevolence; 
if their own self-indulgence is as much restrained as it 
might have been unchecked; if they prefer to govern 
wicked desires more than any people whatsoever; if they 
do all these things not out of craving for empty glory, but 
from love of eternal happiness; and if, for their sins, they 
do not neglect to offer to their true God the sacrifice of 
humility and contrition and prayer. We say that, for the 
time being, such Christian emperors are happy in hope 
and that, in time to come, when that to which we now 
look forward has arrived they will be so in possession.76
Just as in Letter 155, here too we see all the steps of the 
return to God as the source of one’s virtues coming together in 
a single passage: first, we see recognition of God as the source 
of one’s virtues; second, there is a reorientation of motivation 
from human to divine glory; and third, we see the 
corresponding practices of self-examination, confession, and 
repentance. All three of these movements are necessary for 
the perfection of the political virtues and the reception of the 
eternal goods constitutive of eternal happiness. Furthermore, 
in this passage we also find that it is through the work of 
perfecting the political virtues that one avoids the pitfalls of 
imperfect virtue—that is, the cycle of comparison, conformity, 
shame, and suspicion associated with “empty glory.” We now 
turn to the second aspect of the double return: love for God as 
the source of all temporal goods.
5.4.2. God, the Object of Everyone’s Desire
Augustine’s exposition of Psalm 118(119) provides an 
important parallel to his comments in Letter 155 to 
Macedonius about God being the true “object of everyone’s 
desire”:
 (p.163) Not even for the sake of temporal health or 
wellbeing must we do good, but for the eternal wellbeing 
which is our hope. In that eternal wellbeing 
unchangeable good will be ours to enjoy, the good that 
will come to us from God, the good which will be God 
himself.77
The goal, on this leg of the double return, is to follow the many 
temporal goods we use back to their source in the good itself. 
It is all too easy, Augustine preaches, to want goods without 
ever advancing toward a desire for the good itself:
[M]any people cry to the Lord about riches they hope to 
gain or losses they want to avoid, or for the wellbeing of 
their nearest and dearest, or for the security of their 
household, or temporal happiness, or worldly 
advancement; or even perhaps just for bodily fitness … 
Many people pray for these and similar things to the 
Lord, but hardly anyone prays for the Lord himself. 
Indeed, it seems quite easy for a person to want 
something from the Lord without wanting the Lord 
himself, as though anything he gives could be more 
delightful than the giver.78
By ascending to a desire for the giver himself, one begins to 
love God as the good in a “disinterested” way, Augustine says, 
even as one begins to taste and obtain eternal goods in this 
life.79
Augustine describes this “disinterested” and nonpossessive 
love as an enlarging, stretching, and maturing of one’s 
affection for temporal goods. Good use of temporal goods 
requires this growth. For those who have reached this stage of 
love:
Only God remains to them as the [true] object of their 
desires, for they no longer love the earth. They love him 
who made heaven and earth; they love him, and they are 
not yet with him. Their desire is kept waiting so that it 
may grow, and it grows that it may lay hold on its object. 
It is no paltry thing that God will give to one who longs, 
but Himself, who made all that exists; and no small effort 
must a lover make to be capable of receiving so great a 
good. Train yourself until you have a capacity for God; 
long and long for what you will possess forever.80
 (p.164) Augustine picks up this exhortation in his Homilies 
on the First Letter of John and uses the striking image of a 
stretched-out purse:
The entire life of a good Christian is a holy desire. What 
you desire, however, you don’t yet see. But by desiring 
you are made large enough, so that, when there comes 
what you should see, you may be filled. For, if you wish to 
fill a purse, and you know how big what will be given you 
is, you stretch the purse, whether it is made of cloth or 
leather or anything else. You know how much you are 
going to obtain, and you see that your purse is small; by 
stretching it you make it that much larger. This is how 
God stretches our desire through delay, stretches our 
soul through desire, and makes it large enough by 
stretching it … This is our life – to be exercised 
[exercere] through desire.81
The exercise of desire, for Augustine, entails many exercises 
for assessing, refining, and reordering one’s desires toward 
God. These practices result, Augustine preaches in this 
passage, in an overall stretching out of one’s soul toward the 
good. One’s soul must be made capacious in order to receive 
such a supremely desirable end.
Just as we found in the return to God as the source of one’s 
virtue, this return to God as source of all temporal goods is 
difficult work, on Augustine’s account. Anyone undergoing this 
exercise of desire understands that the good cannot be, or 
cannot remain, a mere projection of one’s acquisitive self-
interest. Sometimes this training involves taking pleasure in 
goods and following them up to their source through 
gratitude. Other times the training requires periods of 
deprivation (through abstinence or renunciation) in order to 
sharpen or stretch one’s desire to make room for “so great a 
good.” Still at other times the training requires patient 
endurance of the loss of temporal goods. Loss provides an 
opportunity to assess the quality of one’s love for the good 
itself.
Death represents the ultimate loss of temporal goods. 
Meditation on it, in Augustine’s view, provides a useful 
exercise for shaping one’s relationship to the good, and for 
motivating the twofold return. Recall this characteristic 
passage from Augustine’s preaching on wealth:
Why are you so obsessed with these things [temporal 
goods] as the only means of pleasure and satisfaction? 
That’s not wellbeing. “His spirit will go out, and he will 
return to this earth” (Psalm 146:4). There, that’s what 
his wellbeing amounts to, “a mist that appears for a little 
while”  (p.165) (James 4:14). “His spirit will go out, and 
he will return to earth.” Let a few years pass. Let the 
river flow on as usual, hurrying past the graves of the 
dead. Tell the difference if you can between the bones of 
the rich and the bones of the poor. “When his spirit goes 
out he returns to his earth.”82
Meditating on the inevitable fact of death is an opportunity to 
recognize that one’s goods are not entirely one’s own. They 
are, in an important sense, merely tokens of the highest good 
to be used in the mysterious journey back to God. At the end of 
one’s life, in Augustine’s eyes, one is implicitly being asked to 
accept God as one’s only good.
If one clings tenaciously to God as the source of all goods in 
this life, one’s manifold desires will eventually come to an end 
in satiety:
Yet however richly endowed such a soul may be here on 
earth, what will it be in the world to come, where God 
feeds us? As long as we are still on pilgrimage here, what 
we shall be cannot be told. And perhaps even here, when 
we lift up our hands, we long for that ultimate satiety; we 
long for that state where we shall be totally satisfied 
with God’s lavish gifts so that all our needs will vanish 
utterly, and we shall desire nothing; because whatever 
we desire here, whatever seems most worthy of our love 
here, will be available in its entirety.83
Augustine repeatedly emphasizes that this singular return of 
love for God is not meant to obliterate love for other goods. 
Indeed, love of God, in Augustine’s view, is an overarching 
goal that can unify and order one’s smaller loves for lower 
goods.
I am not saying that you should have no loves; I simply 
want your loves to be properly ordered. Put heavenly 
things before earthly, immortal things before mortal, 
eternal things before transitory ones. And put the Lord 
before everything, and not just by praising him, but also 
by loving him. It is easy enough to give him preference 
when it comes to praise. But … do you show different 
priorities in your love from the preferences you showed 
in your praise?84
It is important to note that one’s singular love for God should 
not block out neighbor love—as was discussed in Chapter 4. 
Augustine is  (p.166) keen to emphasize that the stretching of 
desire for the good always moves upward and outward:
Hence love itself is now practiced in good works of 
charity, by which it stretches itself out to help the 
neighbor in whatever way it can, and this is its breadth 
… Hence love, which looks out for that which is common
rather than for what is private, is said not to seek the 
things that are its own.85
On Augustine’s view the soul has suffered a primordial 
contraction in original sin and part of the remedy for it 
requires this stretching out toward God and neighbor. This 
passage reminds us of Augustine’s claim in Letter 155 that 
there is ultimately a hidden unity between love of God, 
neighbor, and self that one can glimpse in this life.86 The 
journey toward nonpossessive love of the good entails this 
horizontal extension. This stretching prepares us for the 
experience of God as the highest common good who will be 
enjoyed in eternity not in solitude but in that “perfectly 
ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment 
of God, and of one another in God.”87 This fellowship 
represents the culmination of the enclosing circles of oikeiōsis
and the consummation of all temporal goods and virtues in 
eternal happiness. Augustine declares that Macedonius’ life 
exhibits a true longing for this “heavenly commonwealth,” and 
the true friendship with God and neighbor that flow from 
there: “I can tell that your spirit is panting for God’s heavenly 
commonwealth, inspired by a love of … love itself.”88
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